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Abstract
We propose, BanditRepair, a system that systematically ex-
plores and assesses a set of possible runtime patches. The
system is grounded on so-called “bandit algorithms”, that are
online machine learning algorithms, designed for constantly
balancing exploitation and exploration. BanditRepair’s run-
time patches are based on modifying the execution state for
repairing null dereferences. BanditRepair constantly trades
the ratio of automatically handled failures for searching for
new runtime patches and vice versa. We evaluate the sys-
tem with 16 null dereference field bugs, where BanditRepair
identifies a total of 8460 different runtime patches, which
are composed of 1 up to 8 decisions (execution modifica-
tions) taken in a row. We are the first to finely characterize
the search space and the outcomes of runtime repair based
on execution modification.
1. Introduction
Field failures happen in production for any software sys-
tem of sufficient complexity. For instance, it is common to
observe error pages on the Internet while ordering a laser
pointer, registering to a conference, or installing a new blog-
ging platform. Many of them have an economic cost and the
most dramatic software failures lead to loss of lives. To over-
come software failures at runtime, runtime repair techniques
modify the execution so that failures become less critical:
instead of crashing the whole system, only the current task
fails and the system remains available [8, 19, 24]. The lit-
erature refers to those modifications as “runtime patches”
[2, 21, 28]. For instance, with failure oblivious computing
[24], a runtime patch consists of skipping erroneous writes
out of an array’s bounds. In probabilistic memory safety
[3], the runtime patches are controlled blank padding added
around allocated memory. In the latter case, the runtime
patch is a preventive measure and the execution is equiva-
lent with or without the runtime modification. However, in
the failure-oblivious case, the runtime patch has modified
the system state or execution flow in an irreversible way.
In this paper, we consider the case where multiple run-
time patches exist to repair the same failure, which is a sce-
nario that has been very little studied [14, 19]. For instance,
for repairing a null dereference, one can skip the execution
of the statement or craft an arbitrary value before derefer-
encing [19]. We propose, BanditRepair, a system that sys-
tematically explores and assesses a set of possible runtime
patches. The system is grounded on so-called “bandit algo-
rithms” [27], that are machine learning algorithms developed
for A/B testing, which is the art of identifying the best strate-
gies in production with in-the-field controlled experiments.
1.1 Bandit Algorithm for Repair
A bandit algorithm has two goals: 1) to systematically ex-
plore the search space of alternatives (e.g. all possible or-
derings of products) and 2) to maximize the sum of re-
wards earned by successively trying alternatives (e.g. selling
as many products as possible). In a runtime repair context,
we instantiate the “bandit view” as follows: BanditRepair 1)
systematically explores the search space of runtime patches
and 2) increases the number of failures handled by the ap-
plication of a runtime patch, where handled refers to cor-
ralling as follows. A runtime patch is considered to handle1
a failure, if a failure is replaced by the absence of excep-
tions within the scope of a given task, such as web request; if
domain-specific post-recovery assertions exist, they are con-
sidered as well.
The key of bandit algorithms is to constantly balance ex-
ploitation (e.g. choosing the best product ordering seen so
far) and exploration (e.g. finding an even better product or-
dering). BanditRepair is configured by an exploitation co-
efficient ζ (∈]0,1]), that constantly steers the trade-off be-
tween the ratio of handled failures and the search for new
runtime patches. In BanditRepair, the exploration of runtime
patches is speculative in the sense that one never knows in
advance whether a state or flow modification is successful to
handle a failure.
We implement BanditRepair for Java, in a version that is
dedicated to null dereferences. To handle null dereferences,
BanditRepair takes a decision in a pool of possible ones re-
lated to null pointer exceptions (creating objects, reusing
objects, skipping execution). Sometimes, a failure requires
multiple decisions to be taken in a row, which results in
what we call a decision sequence. A runtime patch is a de-
cision sequence that handles a failure. The simplest runtime
patches are unary: they are composed of a single derefer-
1 or “repair” or “recover”, all being considered exchangeable in this paper
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ence repair decision, such as skipping the statement or re-
turning from the method. An example of more complex run-
time patch in BanditRepair is for instance: at line 24, a new
object is crafted to overcome the null dereference, later on
in the execution, at line 42, a statement is skipped to handle
a second, subsequent null pointer exception. In such com-
poiste runtime patches, only one decision in isolation may
not be enough to overcome the failure, only the sequence is
a solution. More generally, a runtime patch contains deci-
sions taken according to a “runtime patch model”. To this
extent, BanditRepair is realized with a runtime patch model
for null pointer exceptions.
1.2 Pareto Front of Runtime Repair
We evaluate BanditRepair on 16 field failures reported for
Java software. We run those field failures in a virtual endless
“while(true)” loop that simulates the same failure happening
again and again for different users, for different requests. By
doing this, we can systematically study the search space of
runtime repair, in terms of how many runtime patches exists,
and how the exploration of alternative runtime patches can
be balanced with exploitation of already known ones.
For instance, let us consider a field failure of Java open
source package Apache Commons Collections, reported as
issue #360, which is about a null pointer exception. We sim-
ulate 200 field failures by reproducing the failure 200 times
in a row. If one configures BanditRepair’s exploitation co-
efficient to explore more than exploit, BanditRepair tries 38
decision sequences and finds that 15 of them overcome the
null dereference. On the other hand, by configuring Ban-
ditRepair to exploit known valid runtime patches more, Ban-
ditRepair tries 27 decision sequences and finds that 13 of
them are valid solutions. In the former cases, 62/200 failures
are handled by 15 different runtime patches, in the latter case
154/200 failures are handled by 13 runtime patches. That is,
we can construct the Pareto front of runtime repair, along
two axes that are the number of different runtime patches
identified (exploration) and the proportion of handled fail-
ures (exploitation).
In our experiment, by summing over the 16 considered
null dereference field bugs, BanditRepair identifies a total of
8460 different runtime patches, which are composed of 1 up
to 8 decisions (execution modifications) taken in a row.
1.3 Reasons for Success
BanditRepair is capable of constructing the Pareto front of
runtime repair for the following reasons. First, it introduces
a key concept for reasoning on modified execution states or
flows, the one of “execution laps”. An execution laps is a
time-bounded logical unit of computation such as a web re-
quest or a command-line execution of a program. The execu-
tion laps is essential because: 1) it delimits the start and the
end of a runtime patch: a runtime patch is composed of all
execution modification decisions that happen within a laps.
2) It comes with a predicate of the end of the laps that as-
sesses the viability of the runtime patch. For instance, a web
request may end with a HTTP success (200) or an internal
server error (500), and a predicate may be ”return code ==
200”. We call such predicate a “laps oracle”. By structur-
ing speculative execution with those novel and original con-
cepts, BanditRepair is able to systematically reason on the
search space of runtime patches.
Second, the fact that multiple runtime patches exist for
the same failure is related to the deep nature of computa-
tion. In a single program execution, there are parts of the
computation that are optional with respect to the task at
hand. If a failure happens in this optional part, it impedes
the whole task [1, 24]. If given enough time to explore the
search space, BanditRepair automatically finds the execution
shortcuts that exist to skip a failure. The other fundamen-
tal characteristics of software exploited by BanditRepair is
that there exists multiple execution paths to achieve the same
computational effect. When those multiple paths are identi-
fied and a failure happens, one alternative path may succeed.
BanditRepair automatically builds a portfolio of alternative
execution paths in a systematic manner.
1.4 Contributions
To sum up, the contributions of this paper are:
• A runtime repair algorithm, BanditRepair, that balances
exploitation and exploration of runtime patches. The al-
gorithm is implemented in Java, for repairing null pointer
dereferences, and is made publicly-available for sake of
open science.
• The characterization and systematic empirical study of
the repair search space for null dereferences with respect
to: (Size) how many different repair decisions can be tried
to handle a given failure?; (Fertility) how many valid se-
quences of repair decisions exist in the search space?;
(Disparity) are all repair decisions equal?; (Trade-off)
what is the impact on the exploitation/exploration bal-
ance on search space exploration.
• An evaluation over 16 null dereference failres, reported
in the field on a public issue tracker, on largely used
Java libraries. By simulating the perpetual occurrences
of those field failures, the evaluation identifies 8460 valid
runtime patches, in an experiment that represents more
than 10 days of computation in a distributed grid.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents our approach for repairing null pointer ex-
ceptions at runtime. Section 3 details our BanditRepair algo-
rithm. Section 4 details the evaluation on 16 field null deref-
erence. Section 5 presents the related works and Section 6
concludes.
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2. Problem Statement
2.1 Motivating Example
Let us consider the example of Listing 1. It is an excerpt of
server code that retrieves the last connection date of a user
and prints it to an HTML page. Method getLastConnection-
Date first gets the user session, then pulls the last connec-
tion date from the session object. This snippet can trigger
two failures that can crash the request: 1) if the session does
not exist and getUserSession returns null, then there is a null
pointer exception at line 3 (NPE1) 2) for the first connection,
getLastConnection returns null, and another null pointer ex-
ception can be thrown at line 6 (NPE2). Now let us con-
sider a runtime repair system such as [18]. It would insert
hooks in code such that, instead of a null dereference, a vi-
able object is crafted upon failure. In Listing 1, to overcome
NPE1 at line 3, such a system could modify the execution
state and flow in three ways: 1) it creates a new session ob-
ject on the fly 2) it returns an arbitrary Date object such as
the current date 3) it returns null. As the example suggests,
there are multiple possible state modifications for the same
failure. However, not all such modifications are equivalent.
For instance, if modification #3 is applied, it triggers another
failure NPE2, whereas solutions #1 and #2 do not further
break the system state. This indicates that not all state mod-
ifications are equivalent, some are best than others. In this
paper, we devise a system that speculatively explores execu-
tion modifications in order to identify the better ones.
Listing 1: Code Excerpt with Two Potential Null Derefer-
ence Failures
1 Date getLastConnectionDate() {
2 Session session = getUserSession();
3 return session.getLastConnection(); // NPE1
4 }
5 ...
6 HTML.write(getLastConnectionDate().toString()); // NPE2
2.2 Problem statement
In this paper, we consider the problem of production fail-
ures. Since programs run in heterogeneous environments,
responding to a large number of unpredictable events and
inputs, errors happen, and manually written error handlers
fail to handle them in many situations [9, 26]. Consequently,
failures in production happen on a daily basis, and crash re-
porting systems routinely collect enormous amounts of fail-
ure information: for instance the publicly available crash re-
porting system of Mozilla collects more than 30,000 crash
reports per day for its Firefox browser [13]. We note that the
same failure often happens multiple times, again and again,
for different users, on different servers, etc.
One solution to this problem is to change the program
state or flow such that the failure does not happen or is mit-
igated and the program is able to proceed with execution.
This is known as runtime repair [15] and state repair [20].
One example of such a runtime repair approach is by Dem-
sky and Rinard [7], who have proposed automatic restoration
of invariants for coping with certain errors that are specific
to data-structure. The ideal repair system would transform a
failure into a correct result. However, this idealized vision is
not realistic and in practice, the goal of runtime repair is to
corral failure propagation, to replace crashed systems with
continued execution, i.e. to increase overall availability.
Preliminary work on runtime repair suggests that for a
single crashing failure, there are several possible repair de-
cisions to be made [6, 14, 19]. For instance, let us a consider
a division by zero, there are several possible repair decisions
that could be made: one can divide by 1, or the result of the
division can be an arbitrary value (0, 1, MAX VALUE or
Not-a-number among others). In other words, upon failure,
there are multiple and different alterations of program state
that can be made to handle it. One alteration may not be
enough to continue the execution after a failure, and after the
first alteration of the program state, another failure may hap-
pen, triggering another alteration and so on. This is known as
“cascaded errors” [19]. The principled handling and system-
atic study of “cascaded errors” and the corresponding cas-
caded repair decisions is an open and unexplored research
field.
Problem: we aim at devising an architecture and a sys-
tem that handles failures, by exploring cascaded run-
time repair decisions (called “decision sequences”) in
a principled and effective way.
2.3 Exploration of Runtime Repair Decisions
Our key insight is that we can exploit the fact that the same
failure happens again and again to explore alternative repair
decisions. For a given failure, our idea is to record the execu-
tion modification decision and its eventual effectiveness and
then to steer the new ones according to the past decisions.
We propose a conceptual framework for this, it seeks to
balance the reuse of past runtime decisions (this is called
exploitation) that have been shown successful and the explo-
ration of new runtime decisions. The terminology exploita-
tion/exploration as well as the core algorithm is inspired
from bandit algorithms.
Bandit algorithms are machine learning algorithms that
aim at maximizing the profit of a player in front of multiple
slot machines (aka one armed bandit machines). To maxi-
mize its profit, the player aims at identifying the machine
that has the largest probability of winning. However, these
probabilities are unknown, hence the player has to estimate
them. After an initial number of trials, he has an estimation
of all winning probabilities, with one being higher than the
others. However, it may only be due to the variance of the
estimation process. Consequently, he has to balance playing
the slot machine with highest probability (exploitation) and
playing the other machines to gain knowledge (exploration).
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We think that the two opposing yet complementary con-
cepts of exploitation and exploration perfectly fit the prob-
lem of runtime repair. When a failure happens, from which
one knows that a solution exists (based on previous execu-
tions), one can either reuse the existing knowledge (apply
the same repair decision) or explore a new solution, which
may prove to be better. As shown in Listing 1, a runtime
patch that does not trigger new failures is better than one that
creates invalid program states. The trade-off between explo-
ration and exploitation of runtime repair is the essence of the
system we present in this paper, a system called BanditRe-
pair. BanditRepair is inspired from the so-called epsilon-
greedy bandit algorithm [27].
3. BanditRepair: runtime repair of failures
In this paper, a failure is defined as an unacceptable interrup-
tion of service of a program for a given input. For instance,
when a web server does not succeed to serve a file, it is a fail-
ure. When a command line program crashes, it is a failure.
Failures are considered deterministic: for the same input and
the same system state the failure always or never happens.
We propose BanditRepair, a conceptual framework and an
algorithm for automatically handling failures at runtime.
3.1 BanditRepair Inputs
BanditRepair requires five inputs: 1) a program in which
runtime repair support will be injected; 2) a failure model
expressing the failures targeted by the system; 3) a laps
model defining the boundaries between which runtime repair
will take place; 4) a laps oracle specifying the viability of the
computation; 5) a runtime patch model listing the possible
modifications on the program state or execution flow.
3.1.1 Program
The first input of BanditRepair is a program P. BanditRe-
pair uses meta-programming to inject in the program a set
of monitoring and runtime intercession hooks. The monitor-
ing hooks include failure detection according to the failure
model (see Section 3.1.2) and runtime contract checking ac-
cording to the laps oracle (see Section 3.1.4). An example of
failure detection is the detection of null dereference by au-
tomatically adding null check (“if (x!=null) ...”) before all
field accesses and method calls. The runtime intercession
hooks enable BanditRepair to change the program execu-
tion if appropriate according to the runtime patch model (see
Section 3.1.5).
3.1.2 Failure Model
BanditRepair is parametrized by a failure model. A fail-
ure model is an abstraction to represent a family of pro-
duction failures. An example of failure models is divide-by-
zero. In BanditRepair, failure models are intentional defini-
tions, where the necessary and sufficient property is a fail-
ure predicate, which returns true if and only if the failure is
about to happen. For detecting divide-by-zero errors, one can
check upfront all denominators of divisions against zero. As
explained in Section 3.4, in this paper, we realize BanditRe-
pair for null dereferences (null pointer exceptions in Java).
3.1.3 Laps Model
A laps model defines a quantization of execution time. Pro-
gram execution contain many natural quanta: for instance a
method execution is an execution quantum, this a method
laps, a request handling in a web server is a quantum (a re-
quest laps), the full execution of a command line program
is a quantum (a command-line laps). As we see in those ex-
amples, a laps model defines when laps start and end. Ban-
ditRepair works with any laps model that defines a laps start
and end. Laps models can be domain specific, for instance,
in a scientific simulation software application, a good laps
model is a simulation step.
3.1.4 Laps Oracle
A laps oracle is a predicate on the program state that is ex-
ecuted at the end of each laps. The goal of a laps oracle is to
validate or invalidate state modifications that have happened
during the laps. For instance, in a web-server with a request
laps model, a laps oracle can be whether the HTTP request
return code is OK (“assert response code == 200”). While
this example predicate only refers to one variable, it can be
arbitrarily complex and refer to many parts of the observ-
able program state. If one considers method laps, a classical
design-by-contract post-condition is a laps oracle.
A laps oracle can serve two purposes. First, it can assess
whether what happened in the laps has not failed, as in the
examples we have given. This is an assertion on the past.
Second, a laps oracle can assess whether the system state is
viable for future actions and requests, this is then an asser-
tion looking ahead, for asserting what Locasto et al. have
called “life after self-healing” [17]. Whether it assesses suc-
cess or viability, the result of the evaluation of the laps or-
acle always tells something about the success of state mod-
ifications that have happened in the laps. In our empirical
experiment, the laps oracles assess the validity of the past
computation.
3.1.5 Runtime Patch Model
When a failure of the failure model under consideration is
about to happen, as detected by the failure predicate, the
program or request (depending on the laps model) is about
to crash. It would indeed have crashed without BanditRepair.
However, with BanditRepair, when a failure is about to crash
the program, BanditRepair replaces the crash by a modifica-
tion of the program state or flow. The modifications are done
according to a runtime patch model.
Definition. A runtime patch model describes how pro-
gram state modifications are performed upon failures. Once
a failure predicate evaluates to true, the program hits a deci-
sion point. A decision point is a point in a program where
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the program state may be modified. At a decision point, a de-
cision must be taken: we call a decision an alteration of the
execution state or flow. For instance, prematurely returning
from the method is such a modification. When a decision is
taken, one says that the decision point has been activated. In
essence, a decision is speculative: BanditRepair never knows
in advance whether the decision is correct. The only way to
assess it is to proceed with execution and wait for the evalu-
ation of the laps oracle.
Within a laps, several decision points may be activated,
due to cascaded failures. A decision sequence is composed
of consecutive decisions (runtime repair actions), where
there is one decision per failure of the failure cascade. The
decision are instances of the runtime patch model, the fail-
ures of the failure model. At the end of a laps, the laps ora-
cle is evaluated. If it evaluates to true, it means that a valid
decision sequence has been found. A runtime patch is a
decision sequence that has been validated by the laps oracle.
For instance, let us consider again the example of Listing 1,
returning null is a failed decision sequence because the re-
quest crashes with HTTP 500, internal server error, due to
NPE1. On the contrary, returning a fresh date object enables
the request to succeed and the HTML to be generated, this
is a valid unary decision sequence, i.e. a runtime patch.
Within a runtime patch, the first activated decision point
has a special status. First, it is where the program was about
to crash: consequently, we call the first activated decision
point in a laps the failure point. Second, it is from there
that the program execution will speculatively explore new
runtime states. In this paper, we implement BanditRepair
with the “NpeFix” runtime patch model [5], described in
Section 3.4.
3.2 BanditRepair Effects
The core of BanditRepair is an engine that selects one deci-
sion when a failure is detected, that is when decision point is
hit.
When a failure, instance of the failure model under con-
sideration, is detected at a decision point, BanditRepair has
to take one decision in order to handle the failure (instead of
letting the program crash). This is done as follows.
Case 1: The decision point has never been activated,
which means that the failure has never happened in this
location of the program before. For instance, when a null
dereference has never been seen up to now at line 3 of
Listing 1. In this case, BanditRepair randomly selects a
decision in the set of alternative possible decisions.
Case 2: The failure has already been seen before at this
point in the program. For instance, in a server program, it
means that another user has already encountered the same
failure, by performing the same sequence of interactions
with the program. When this happens, BanditRepair has to
choose between exploitation and exploration as follows.
Case 2a exploitation: When the failure has already hap-
pened, it means that one or more decisions have already been
Algorithm 1 The main algorithm of BanditRepair
Input: P: a program
Input: F: a failure detector
Input: L: a laps model
Input: O: a laps oracle
Input: R: runtime patch model
Input: ζ : the exploitation coefficient in [0..1]
Output: S: a set of portfolio of runtime patches for each
failure point location
1: while true do
2: L.start()
3: while failure f happens according to F do
4: if failure is not known then
5: apply a random decision Case 1
6: else
7: if rand < ζ then
8: apply up-to-now best runtime patch from S
Case 2a
9: else
10: d← select an unused decision according to R
11: apply d (change the state or flow) Case 2b
12: end if
13: end if
14: proceed with laps execution
15: end while
16: L.end()
17: if laps oracle O is success then
18: store runtime patch in S
19: end if
20: end while
taken during another laps (i.e. the program execution has al-
ready been altered in the past in another request, for another
user). For each past decisions, the laps oracle has been eval-
uated, and BanditRepair has stored whether the past failure
was considered handled according to the laps oracle. When
BanditRepair chooses exploitation, it selects one decision
sequence which has been the most successful over the past
laps. We use the term “exploitation” to refer to the fact that
the system exploits its knowledge, by maximizing the likeli-
hood of handling the failure.
Case 2b exploration: When the failure has already hap-
pened at a given decision point, BanditRepair may choose to
take a decision that was never taken before at this point. In
this case, BanditRepair speculatively explores new runtime
patches.
To choose between exploitation (case 2a) and exploration
(case 2b) BanditRepair draws a random variable from a uni-
form distribution. If it lower than an exploitation coefficient
ζ (zeta), it selects exploitation, otherwise it selects explo-
ration. For instance, BanditRepair with ζ = 0.2 prefers ex-
ploitation 20% of the time, and exploration 80% of the time.
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Table 1: BanditRepair’ possible decisions upon null derefer-
ence failures.
Strategy Id Description
replacement
reuse S1 injection of an existing
compatible object
creation S2 injection of a new ob-
ject
sk
ip
pi
ng
line S3 skip statement
m
et
ho
d
noting S4a return a null or void to
caller
creation S4b return a new object to
caller
reuse S4c return an existing com-
patible object to caller
For large exploitation coefficients ζ , BanditRepair of-
ten reuses known runtime patches, for low coefficients,
BanditRepair faster explores the space of possible runtime
patches. This effect will be empirically studied in Section 4.
In the limit case of ζ = 1, BanditRepair only performs
case 1 and case 2a, which means that as long as one runtime
patch is found at a decision point, it is always applied over
and over. We call this the full exploitation policy.
3.3 BanditRepair Algorithm
Algorithm 1 presents BanditRepair. It takes as input a pro-
gram, a failure detector, a laps model, a laps oracle and a
runtime patch model, as explained in Section 3.1. Then, for
every laps, if a failure is detected, BanditRepair randomly se-
lects between exploitation (line 8) and exploration (line 10).
If the laps oracle validates the decision sequence, it becomes
a runtime patch (according to our definition of Section 3.1.5)
and is stored as such. Overtime, BanditRepair builds a set of
runtime patches for each failure location, we call it a port-
folio of runtime patches, a portfolio of decision sequences
that have proven successful at least once.
All runtime patches in a portfolio share the common
property that they pass the laps oracle. However, they dif-
fer from two perspectives. First, they may involve different
decision points, at different locations in the program under
consideration. Second, they may have different size, where
the size of the runtime patch is the number of decisions
taken. A runtime patch can be considered better if it con-
tains fewer decisions, because it is likely to change less the
execution state, and hence to stay closer to the states cre-
ated by the initial program and envisioned by the developer.
In other words, the smaller runtime patch creates execution
states that are less speculative than the ones created by a big-
ger runtime patch. This will be explored in Section 4.4.3.
3.4 Implementation
We implement BanditRepair for null dereferences, aka null
pointer exceptions (this is the failure model) with a runtime
patch model dedicated to them, called NpeFix [5]. In Npe-
Fix, all object variable dereferences are decision points (field
accesses, method calls on local variables, method parame-
ters, implicit casts and fields). A decision has to be taken
when the variable is null, which means that decision points
are activated if and only if a null is going to be dereferenced.
For each decision point, NpeFix defines 6 types of decision,
grouped in two categories, shown in Table 1. The first cat-
egory consists of replacing the null value by an alternative
valid non-null object of a compatible type. This category is
composed of two-sub-categories: 1) when a variable is null,
one can reuse an object from another variable in the scope
instead, these are reuse-based decisions (on top of Table 1);
2) when a variable is null, one can also create a new object
on the fly, these are creation-based decisions. Note that the
number of possible decisions for reuse and creation based
decisions is parametrized by the number of variables (resp.
constructors) available, which means that for a single deci-
sion point, there are often dozens of different available deci-
sions (and not only 6).
The second category is based on skipping the execution
of the code affected by the null variable, one can either skip
the line that uses the null variable, or skip the rest of the
method. When skipping the rest of a method which returns a
value, one can also either reuse an existing object or create
one on the fly. To implement the NpeFix runtime patch
model, we use source code transformation: we inject code
at each decision point and the injected code is responsible
to activate the decision point and actually performing the
state or flow modification if necessary. For the interested
reader, this runtime patch model and its implementation are
extensively described in [5].
4. Evaluation
We now present the evaluation of BanditRepair. During this
evaluation we focus on the following research questions.
RQ1. [Size] Does the core assumption of BanditRepair
hold? How large is the runtime repair space? Bandit
exploration of runtime patches only makes sense under the
following conditions: 1) the repair space at runtime contains
different alternatives; and 2) not all alternatives are valid.
The answer to this research question will (in)validate the
core assumption of BanditRepair.
RQ2. [Fertility] What is the proportion of valid deci-
sion sequences? In the context of runtime repair, there may
exists different runtime patches that are all valid, that all fix
the runtime failure. The proportion of valid repair decision
sequences represents the fertility of the search space. When
the goal is to find at least one valid decision sequence, it
is much easier to do so if many points in the search space
are valid. On the contrary, if there is a single point in the
search space, in the worst case, it requires visiting the com-
plete search space before finding it. The fertility of the search
space is the opposite of what is called “hardness” or “con-
strainedness” in combinatorial optimization.
6 2018/8/15
RQ3. [Disparity] To what extent does the search space
contain composite runtime patches? BanditRepair builds a
portfolio of runtime patches, which are disparate in the sense
that they can have a different size. In this paper, we consider
that a smaller runtime patch, i.e. containing fewer decisions,
is better than a bigger composite one, because it creates less
exotic execution states (see Section 3.3). We will observe
in our dataset, whether there exists such composite runtime
patches.
RQ4. [Trade-off] What is the impact of the exploita-
tion coefficient ζ on repair? The essence of bandit algo-
rithms is to alternate exploitation of valid decisions and ex-
ploration of alternative ones. In the context of runtime repair,
it means applying a runtime patch that has proven to be suc-
cessful or searching for alternative runtime patches. We will
explore the impact of the exploitation coefficient ζ on the
time to find a first runtime patch and the overall proportion
of avoided failures.
4.1 Dataset
In order to evaluate our runtime repair approach, we need
real and reproducible production failures. Since we instanti-
ate the bandit repair vision with null pointer exceptions, we
collect null dereference failures.
To collect them, we look for null dereferences that are re-
ported on a publicly-available forum (e.g. a bug tracker) and
we assess that they are reproducible. In particular, we focus
on failures in the Apache foundation projects because these
projects are frequently used and have very good practices
for bug reporting and field failure reproduction. In Apache,
one guideline is to encode reproduced field bugs as test case.
Consequently, our dataset of field bugs is composed of test
cases, written by the developers of each project under con-
sideration, which reproduce field bugs. In addition to the
triple criteria of being field, reproducible and encoded as test
cases, we aim at 1) having bugs in different projects and 2)
having bugs in large enough software (where “large” is de-
fined as more than 10,000 lines of code).
As a result, the benchmark contains 16 field bugs (1 from
Collections, 3 from Lang, 7 from Math, 3 from PDFBox, 1
from Sling and 1 from Felix). This dataset only contains real
null dereference bugs and no artificial or toy bugs. To give
the reader a feeling of how hard it is to reproduce field bugs,
we note that it took us appropriately 1 full month to build
this dataset. As comparison, [24] considers 5 field failures.
For sake of future work and comparative evaluations on this
topic, this dataset is made publicly available on GitHub.2
Table 2 presents our benchmark of 16 field bugs. The first
column contains the Apache bug id. The second column con-
tains the SVN revision of the global Apache SVN. The third
column contains the number of line of code. The fourth col-
umn contains the total number of method call before the null
pointer exception is trigger. For example, issue Collections-
2 BanditRepair dataset: https://goo.gl/937Egi
Table 2: Dataset of 16 bugs with null dereference in six
Apache open-source projects.
Bug ID SVN revision LOC
# method calls
before null
Collections-360 1076034 21650 13
Felix-4960 1691137 33057 2
Lang-304 489749 17277 2
Lang-587 907102 17317 10
Lang-703 1142381 19047 9
Math-1115 1590254 90782 328
Math-1117 1590251 90794 342
Math-290 807923 38265 88
Math-305 885027 38893 8
Math-369 940565 41082 7
Math-988A 1488866 82442 136
Math-988B 1488866 82443 134
PDFBox-2812 1681643 67294 37
PDFBox-2965 1701905 64375 54
PDFBox-2995 1705415 64821 37
Sling-4982 1700424 1182 2
Total: 16 applications from 6 projects 770721 1209
360 fixed at revision 1076034 is within an application 21650
lines of code. The number of calls before the dereference
gives an insight on the complexity of the setup required to
reproduce the field failure. As shown in Table 2, there are
between 2 and 342 application methods (not counting JDK
methods) called for the reproduced field failures under con-
sideration, with an average of 75.56. This indicates that the
failures in our benchmark are not simple tests with a trivial
call to a method with null parameters.
4.2 Experimental Protocol
We perform two experiments. The first one is based on
the exhaustive exploration of the search space of runtime
patches, as defined by our runtime patch model for null
pointer exceptions described in Section 3.4. The second
experiment trades-off exploration and exploitation of the
search space. Both are done on the benchmark of failures
presented in Section 4.1.
4.2.1 Exhaustive exploration
To exhaustively explore the search space of runtime patches
for a given failure, we simply recursively explore all possible
alternative decisions. For the first decision taken at the fail-
ure point (the first decision point in a laps), we take all deci-
sions one after the other. Then, for each new decision points
activated by the first decision, we also explore all possible
decisions. This is done recursively. In other words, we build
the complete decision tree of repair decisions for a given fail-
ure.
The time required to perform such an experiment has a
bottom bound of the size of the search space multiplied by
the time for reproducing the failure. The alternative compu-
tation that comes after the first repair decision at the failure
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point is added on top of this. Overall our experiment takes
more than 10 days.
4.2.2 Bandit exploration
The study of exploration of runtime patches is done as fol-
lows. 1. We instrument each buggy program of our dataset
with our repair framework. 2. We execute each instrumented
program with the test case that encodes the field bugs. 3. We
collect all decisions taken at runtime 4. We execute the run-
time assertions at the end of the test cases
We run step #3 and #4 a large number of times, it simu-
lates users that trigger a production failure again and again.
Indeed, production bugs keep reappearing as long as they
are not fixed. This is why crash reporting systems have large
number of instances of the same crash [13]. We trigger all
failures exactly 200 times. For instance, we run the crash-
ing test case of bug LANG-304 200 times, simulating that
the crash happens on 200 user machines spread over the
world, and communicating one another or to a server about
the crashes, in an application community style [16]. In the
following, a sequence of 200 runs is called a scenario (the
scenario of having 200 users triggering the same failure).
In addition, BanditRepair is parametrized by an explo-
ration/exploitation coefficient. We would like to understand
the impact of this coefficient. Consequently, we apply the
whole process (step #1 to step #4) for 11 different exploita-
tion coefficient ζ from 0 to 1 with a 0.1 step. In the follow-
ing, we use the term “run” to refer to one failure execution
(one test case), for one given exploitation coefficient.
Finally, recall that our algorithm contains a random com-
ponent. Our implementation fully controls this randomness
by using a parametrized seed of the random number gener-
ator. However, it may happen that the system works acci-
dentally well for a given seed. To mitigate this risk, for each
exploitation coefficient, we repeat the process with 31 dif-
ferent random seeds.
In total, we execute 16 bugs × 200 executions × 11 ζ
× 31 seeds = 1 091 200 executions. The raw data of this
evaluation is publicly available on GitHub.3 We answer to
all research questions based on this data.
4.2.3 Validity of Repair Decision Sequences
For a given decision sequence taken in response to a failure,
we assess its validity according to the laps oracle. In those
experiments, the laps oracle are directly extracted from the
test case reproducing the field failure. As such, a decision
sequence is considered as valid, if no null pointer exception
is thrown, and no other exception is thrown. A decision
sequence is considered as invalid, if the original null pointer
exception is thrown (meaning that that there is no possible
decision at the failure point), or another exception is thrown
and not caught. When the test case contains domain-specific
assertions beyond the occurrence or not of exceptions, we
3 The raw evaluation data of BanditRepair: https://goo.gl/TJezRr.
Figure 1: Excerpt of the decision tree of Math-988A. One
path is this tree is a “decision sequence”, one path resulting
in a success (OK) is a “runtime patch”. DPx refers to a
decision point upon a null dereference failure.
keep them, and a decision sequence is considered valid if
all assertions pass after the application of the runtime patch.
This is the case for 14/16 failures.
4.3 Case Study
By applying the protocol of Section 4.2, we obtain runs for
which runtime patches are identified. We now discuss the
runtime patches of Math-988A, where the null pointer ex-
ception is thrown during the geometrical computation of the
intersection of two lines when they do not have intersection.
The initial null pointer exception is triggered in the return
statement of method “toSubSpace” which returns an object
of type Vector1D. The null pointer exception appears when
a Vector2D parameter is null and methods getX and getY
are called on it. As shown in Table 3 the size of the deci-
sion sequences varies between 1 and 3 for this bug, meaning
that there are between 1 and 3 null dereferences happening
depending on the selected decisions, for which a decision is
taken.
Overall, BanditRepair identifies the following runtime
patches: 1. initialize the null parameter with a new instance
(1 decision point) 2. use a new and disposable instance of
Vector2D at the both places where the null parameter is used
(between 2 decision points) 3. return null either at the first
NPE location or at the second one, triggering another deci-
sion in the caller (between 2 and 3 decision points) 4. re-
turn a new instance Vector1D (1 decision point) Recall that
in our setup, the laps begins with the execution of the test
that reproduces the field failure and it stops at the end of
the test execution. In this case, the test contains Junit as-
sertions checking the expected correct behavior (which is to
return null when no intersection exists). The runtime patch
passes those assertions, it means that in this case, runtime
repair achieves full correctness. By comparing the decision
sequence to the human patch, they are indeed equivalent, yet
different. This confirms that there sometimes exists multiple
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Table 3: Data set of 16 bugs with null dereference in six
Apache open-source projects.
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Min. Med. Max.
Collections-360 2 45 16 2 2 2
Felix-4960 1 10 4 1 1 1
Lang-304 1 7 6 1 1 1
Lang-587 1 28 1 1 1 1
Lang-703 4 459 130 2 2 2
Math-1115 1 5 5 1 1 1
Math-1117 21 51785 7708 7 8 8
Math-290 1 14 4 1 1 1
Math-305 1 4 3 1 1 1
Math-369 2 14 0 — — —
Math-988A 3 576 383 1 2 3
Math-988B 1 32 17 1 1 1
Pdfbox-2812 8 294 168 1 6 7
Pdfbox-2965 1 4 3 1 1 1
Pdfbox-2995 1 5 1 1 1 1
Sling-4982 2 16 11 1 1 1
Total 51 53298 8460 1 1 8
execution paths for achieving the same computational effect.
Figure 1 shows an excerpt of the possible paths in the deci-
sion tree from laps start to laps oracle evaluation.
4.4 Results
4.4.1 RQ1. [Size] Does the core assumption of
BanditRepair hold? How large is the runtime
repair space?
We analyze the data obtained with the experiment described
in Section 4.2.1, consisting of exhaustively exploring the
search space of runtime patches for null dereferences. We
create a table that contains the core metrics we are interested
in, it is reproduced in Table 3.
Table 3 reads as follows. Each line corresponds to a fail-
ure of our dataset. Each column gives the value of a metric
of interest. The first column contains the name of each bug.
The third column contains the number of possible repair de-
cision sequences for this failure. The fourth column contains
the number of runtime patches (valid decision sequences for
which the laps oracle has stated that the decision sequence
has worked). The fifth column contains the minimum/medi-
an/maximum number of decisions taken for valid decision
sequences.
For example the first line of Table 3 details the bug
Collections-360. To repair this failure at runtime, there are
two possible decision points, which, when they are system-
atically unfolded, correspond to 45 possible decision se-
quences, 16 of which being valid according to the laps ora-
cle. The size of the valid decision sequences is always equals
to 2, which means that there must be two decisions taken in
a row to handle the failure.
The core assumption of BanditRepair is that there exists
multiple alternative decisions to repair a failure at runtime.
This assumption is reflected by the number of explored de-
cision sequences, which is exactly the size of our search
space since we conduct an exhaustive exploration. In this ex-
periment, it ranges between 4 decisions (for Math-305 and
PdfBox-2965) to 576 for Math-988A and 53951 for Math-
1117.
Overall, we notice a great variance of the size of the re-
pair space. To sum up, for all 16 failures of our benchmark,
there exists alternative repair decisions to be taken at run-
time. However, this was not at all an inclusion criterion for
building the benchmark. It strongly suggests that alternative
runtime repair decisions are prevalent for null dereference
failures, and validates our core assumption.
We also see in Table 3 that there is a correlation between
the number of activated decision points for a given failure
and the number of possible decision sequences. For instance,
for Felix-4960, there is only one activated decision point (at
the failure point where the null pointer exception is about to
happen), and 10 possible decisions can be taken at this point.
On the contrary, Math-1117 has the biggest number of acti-
vated decision points resulting in a huge search space, 51
785 decision sequences. This correlation is expected and ex-
plained analytically as follows. Once a first decision is made
at the failure point (where the null dereference is about to
happen), many alternative execution paths are uncovered.
Then, a combinatorial explosion of stacked decisions hap-
pens. If we assume that there are 5 alternative decisions at
the first decision point, and that each of them triggers a dif-
ferent execution path and another decision point (all differ-
ent) with 10 alternatives, it directly results in 5× 10 = 50
possible decision sequences. One can easily extrapolate that
for more than 2 stacked decision points, there is a combi-
natorial explosion. In general, the size of the repair space
depends on: 1. the overall number of decision points ac-
tivated for a given failure 2. the number of possible deci-
sions at each decision point 3. and the correlation between
each decision point, that is the extent to which one decision
influences the number of possible subsequent decisions to
be taken. For failures with large # of explored decision se-
quences, it means that runtime repair unfolds a large num-
ber of diverse program states and their corresponding subse-
quent executions.
Answer to RQ1. The core assumption of BanditRepair
holds: there are multiple alternative decision sequences
to handle null dereferences. BanditRepair draws a pre-
cise picture of the runtime repair search space. In our ex-
periment, there are 11/16 failures for which we observe
more than 10 possible decision sequences (column “Nb
decision seq.”) for the same failure and according to our
runtime patch model, with a maximum value of 51785
(for Math-1117)
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4.4.2 RQ2. [Fertility] What is the proportion of valid
decision sequences?
Now that we have a clearer picture of the size of the search
space, we are interested in knowing whether there exists
multiple valid decision sequences in that space. To do so, we
still consider the exhaustive study protocol described in Sec-
tion 4.2.1 whose results are give in Table 3. We concentrate
especially on the column showing the number of valid deci-
sion sequences. We compare it against the column represent-
ing the size of the search space, i.e. the total number of pos-
sible decision sequences. For instance, for Collections-360,
the search space contains 45 possible decision sequences, in
which 16 are valid according to the laps oracle (the absence
of null pointer exception and the two assertions at the end
of the test case reproducing the failure pass). This makes a
proportion of 16/45 = 36% of valid decision sequences in
the search space.
We notice several interesting extremum cases in Table 3.
First there are two failures – Lang-587 and PdfBox-2995 –
for which only 1 valid decision sequence exists. Also there is
one failure for which all decisions remove the failures, this is
Math-1115 for which 5 out of 5 possible decision sequences
are valid. In general there is a great diversity of fertility (the
proportion of runtime patches in the search space), which
can be explained by two factors: first the strength of the laps
oracle, which is in our case the strength of the assertions at
the end of the test case that reproduces the failure (beyond
not throwing a null pointer exception). The second factor is
related to the new program states that are explored, once a
first decision has been taken. If those speculative program
states are too unrealistic, there is a great chance that the
corresponding decision sequences are invalid (for instance
because another exception is thrown). Along the same line,
if the first decision taken, at the failure point, yields exotic
program states, it is unlikely that the subsequent decisions
put the system back into a viable state.
Answer to RQ2. In our benchmark, the proportion of
valid decision sequences varies from 0/14% to 100%,
from 0 to 7708/51785 valid runtime patches. This great
variation is due to the varying complexity of the system
state at the failure point, and the hardness of the laps or-
acle. When the proportion of valid repair decision se-
quences is high, it means that BanditRepair is able to
quickly find a valid runtime patch, based on a small num-
ber of failure occurrences.
4.4.3 RQ3. [Disparity] To what extent does the search
space contain composite runtime patches?
We have shown in RQ2 that there are multiple valid runtime
patches. Now, we aim to determine which runtime patches
from our runtime patch portfolio are better with respect to
their size, as measured by the number of decisions. To do
so, we study the results of the exhaustive study protocol de-
scribed in Section 4.2.1 whose results are given in Table 3.
Table 4: Core Metrics of Running BanditRepair on the
16 Failures of our Benchmark. Column “Nb valid runtime
patches” shows that more than 1 sequence of repair deci-
sions which is valid exists.
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Collections-360
1.0 2 3 1 99% 4
0.8 2 27 13 77% 45
0.2 2 38 15 31% 22
0.0 2 38 15 20% 20
Felix-4960
1.0 1 2 1 100% 3
0.8 1 10 4 88% 36
0.2 1 10 4 52% 13
0.0 1 10 4 40% 11
Lang-304
1.0 1 1 1 100% 2
0.8 1 7 6 96% 31
0.2 1 7 6 87% 12
0.0 1 7 6 84% 11
Lang-587
1.0 1 13 1 92% 19
0.8 1 28 1 76% 96
0.2 1 28 1 22% 33
0.0 1 28 1 4% 29
Lang-703
1.0 4 10 2 96% 14
0.8 4 83 37 76% 199
0.2 4 139 43 28% 97
0.0 4 130 32 18% 75
Math-1115
1.0 1 1 1 100% 2
0.8 1 5 5 100% 22
0.2 1 5 5 100% 7
0.0 1 5 5 100% 6
Math-1117
1.0 10 79 0 0% 192
0.8 10 79 0 0% 190
0.2 10 81 0 0% 186
0.0 10 78 0 0% 177
Math-290
1.0 1 3 1 99% 4
0.8 1 14 4 84% 54
0.2 1 14 4 42% 18
0.0 1 14 4 28% 15
Math-305
1.0 1 1 1 100% 2
0.8 1 4 3 94% 15
0.2 1 4 3 80% 6
0.0 1 4 3 75% 5
Math-369
1.0 2 13 0 0% 101
0.8 2 13 0 0% 81
0.2 2 13 0 0% 49
0.0 2 13 0 0% 49
Math-988A
1.0 2 1 1 100% 2
0.8 3 92 86 98% 129
0.2 3 114 104 94% 181
0.0 3 117 105 92% 190
Math-988B
1.0 1 2 1 100% 3
0.8 1 32 17 90% 146
0.2 1 32 17 62% 40
0.0 1 32 17 52% 33
Pdfbox-2812
1.0 2 1 1 100% 2
0.8 8 23 19 94% 127
0.2 8 43 33 74% 64
0.0 8 49 36 64% 55
Pdfbox-2965
1.0 1 1 1 100% 2
0.8 1 4 3 95% 19
0.2 1 4 3 80% 6
0.0 1 4 3 74% 5
Pdfbox-2995
1.0 1 3 1 99% 4
0.8 1 5 1 82% 15
0.2 1 5 1 36% 6
0.0 1 5 1 20% 6
Sling-4982
1.0 2 3 2 100% 4
0.8 2 16 11 93% 76
0.2 2 16 11 75% 22
0.0 2 16 11 68% 17
Average
1.0 2.06 8.56 1 86% 22.50
0.8 2.50 27.62 13.12 77% 80.06
0.2 2.50 34.56 15.62 53% 47.62
0.0 2.50 34.38 15.19 46% 44
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We especially concentrate on the column showing the size
of the valid decision sequences. This column gives the min-
imum, median and maximum size within the portfolio. For
instance, for PDFBox-2812, the minimal size in number of
decisions among all runtime patches is 1, the median size is
6 and the maximal size is 7.
This data supports the following findings. First, one sees
that there exists runtime patches composed of more than
one decision. For instance, for Collections-360, all runtime
patches contains 2 decisions. Since our failure and runtime
repair model is specific to null pointer exceptions, it means
that there exists decisions for which the null dereference
problem is not definitely solved by the first decision, and
that another null dereference happens later. This is indeed
the case for Collections-360 where the null variable is used
twice in two different methods.
Second, in 10/16 of our dataset, the runtime patches
are always composed of a single decision. This is strongly
correlated to the size of the search space (third column, #
of decision sequences), hence indicating that the test case
reproducing the production failure, sets up a program state
that is repairable in one shot.
Third, in 3/16 failures, there are runtime patches of dif-
ferent size (Math-988A, PDFBox-2812, Math-1117). For in-
stance, for Math-988A, there exists runtime patches of 1, 2
and 3 decisions. This means that there are decisions at the
failure point that definitely solve the problem according to
the laps oracle (those of patches of size 1). Assuming that
the search first finds a complex runtime patch with many de-
cisions, it is indeed necessary to further explore the search
space in order to identify a smaller, hence better runtime
patch. Forth, in one case (Math-369), there are several deci-
sion taken, but none of them are valid and there is no runtime
patch. All decision sequences are invalidated by the laps or-
acle (the assertions of the test case reproducing the field fail-
ure).
When a runtime patch of size 1 is found, it may be argued
that it is best, and that the speculative exploration could be
stopped. This is not what BanditRepair does, because it aims
at building a portfolio of runtime patches, and there may
exists other runtime patches of size 1 in the search space.
Answer to RQ3. For 5/16 failures of our benchmark,
the search space contains composite runtime patches that
have more than one decision. For 3/16 failures, the possi-
ble runtime patches have disparate sizes, and exploratory
search of new runtime patches enables to find smaller
runtime patches.
4.4.4 RQ4. [Trade-off] What is the impact of the
exploitation coefficient ζ on repair?
Following the protocol based on bandit exploration de-
scribed in Section 4.2.2, we vary the value of the exploita-
tion coefficient ζ and explore the impact it has on the search
process. The results are given in Table 4.
Table 4 reads as follows. Each line corresponds to a
reproduced failure of our dataset. Each column gives the
value of a metric of interest. Each failure line is split in
four, corresponding to four different exploitation coefficient
ζ (0, 0.2, 0.8 and 1). The first column contains the name of
each bug. The second column contains the value of the ζ
parameter for a given line (as defined in Section 3.2). The
third column is the number of encountered decision points
over the 200 laps. The fourth column contains the number
of explored decision sequences. The fifth column contains
the number of valid decision sequences. The sixth column
contains the number of laps before a decision sequence is
valid and succeeds the laps oracle.
For example, let us consider Collections-360 with ζ set
to 0.8 (second line of the four lines for this failure). During
these runs, two locations in code trigger a null dereference,
which means that two decision points are activated. The
combination of decisions over those two decision points re-
sults in 27 explored decision sequences for ζ =1 (this means
that the first 26 decision sequences are invalid, and the 27th
is a runtime patch which is then exploited). Among those
26 decision sequences, 12 are considered valid according to
the laps oracle. Among the 11 runs, it took a median of 3
runs before finding a valid decision sequence that fixes the
failure.
The value of the exploitation coefficient ζ has an impact
on the repair as follows. First, it has an impact on the number
of activated decision points. For Math-1117 and Math-369,
Math-998A and Pdfbox-2812, if we explore more and ex-
ploit less (lower ζ ), we explore less of the search space, and
hence activate fewer decision points. The number of acti-
vated decision points is a coarse grain view of the explored
search space. The fourth column showing the number of ex-
plored decision sequences better reflects what we are inter-
ested in. For all failures, if we increase the amount of ex-
ploration (lower ζ ), this indeed results in trying out more
decision sequences (corresponding to a larger figure in 4th
column). This validates the overall tradeoff architecture of
BanditRepair for balancing exploration and exploitation.
Now, let us consider the number of valid decision se-
quences. As expected, the proportion is valid sequences is
roughly the same as the ones found during exhaustive ex-
ploration. Also, when there is full exploitation (ζ = 1), the
search stops when a valid decision sequence is found, which
can be observed in the table (only one runtime patch is iden-
tified for the columns where ζ = 1), this is an evidence of the
correctness of our implementation. Interestingly, for Math-
1117, there is no valid decision sequence found (while such
sequence exists in the search space as shown in Table 4). The
reason is that the number of runs of the experiment (200)
is too small compared to the size of the search space, and
the valid decision sequence has not yet been found after 200
runs.
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Figure 2: Pareto Front of Runtime Repair for Lang-587
(bettered view on screen or with color printing). Bigger
exploitation coefficient yields higher proportion of handled
failures, but slower time to explore the repair search space.
Now we concentrate on the number of handled failures
which directly reflects the number of users affected by the
bug. For instance, for Pdfbox-2812, if one exploits a lot (ζ
=0.8) one handles 189 failures and builds a portfolio of 19
alternative runtime patches. On the contrary, in one exploits
less and explores a lot (ζ =0.2), one handles 147 failures but
collects 33 runtime patches (> 19). The rule is the more one
exploits (bigger ζ , such as 1 or 0.8) the more failures are
handled. However, this is done to the price of not building a
portfolio of alternative runtime patches. This is the essence
of the balance between exploration and exploitation.
We now graphically depict the tradeoff between explo-
ration and exploitation of runtime patches. Figure 2 is scat-
ter plot of evaluation runs for failure Lang-587. Each dot is
a run for a given random seed and exploitation coefficient.
Hence, there are 10∗31= 310 dots.
The dots are colored by the value of the exploitation co-
efficient ζ . For a given run (dot), the X axis is the number of
laps before the exploration becomes unsuccessful (no new
decision sequences discovered after that), it corresponds to
the 7th column of Table 4. The Y-axis corresponds to the pro-
portion of fixed failures shown in the 6th column of Table 4.
For instance, the top-most blue point, is an exploration with
ζ =0.9, for which 180/200 (90%) runs are successfully re-
paired at runtime. In this figure, one clearly sees the Pareto
front of the tradeoff between exploration and exploitation.
The more one exploits, the longer it takes to explore the
repair search space, but the more failures are handled. On
the contrary, if one explores a lot (low ζ ), the search space
is traversed really fast, building a large portfolio of runtime
patches, but with a low proportion of handled failures. Inter-
estingly, when using BanditRepair, there is irreducible warm
up time before finding a valid repair decision sequence: this
is the empty space between x = 0 and x = 28 at the right
hand side of the figure. This is explained by the fact that
we explore new decisions in a deterministic manner (only
the choice between exploration and exploitation is random)
, exploring decisions one after the other in the same order
during the exploration phase. According to this determinis-
tic order, for Lang-587 shown in this figure, it means that the
28th explored decision sequence is the first valid one.
Answer to RQ4. The exploitation coefficient ζ has an
impact on the size of the explored search space, the
number of repaired failures, and the size of the portfolio
of discovered runtime patches. The relation between ζ
and those three core metrics draws a Pareto front of
runtime repair.
5. Related work
There are several automatic repair techniques that handle
failures at runtime.
One of the earliest techniques is Ammann and Knight’s
“data diversity” [1], that aims at enabling the computation of
a program in the presence of failures. The idea of data diver-
sity is that, when a failure occurs, the input data is changed
so that the new input resulting from the change does not re-
sult in the failure. The assumption is that the output based
on this artificial input, through an inverse transformation, re-
mains acceptable in the domain under consideration. The in-
put transformations can be seen as a kind of runtime patch
model. As such, the BanditRepair algorithm could be used
to reason on the associated runtime search space.
Demsky et al. [7] presents a language for the specification
of data structure invariants. The invariant specification is
used to verify and repair the consistency of data structure
instances at runtime. The key difference between their work
and ours is that BanditRepair is more generic in scope, only
requiring a laps model and a laps oracle, which go beyond
data structure errors and invariant restoration only.
Rinard et al. [24] presents a technique to avoid illegal
memory accesses by adding additional code around each
memory operation during the compilation process. For ex-
ample, the additional code verifies at runtime that the pro-
gram only uses the allocated memory. If the memory access
is outside the allocated memory, the access is ignored instead
crashing with a segmentation fault. The two differences be-
tween this work and BanditRepair are: first BanditRepair can
apply different decisions to handle a given failure (and not
a single code, hard-coded in the injected code), and second,
BanditRepair uses an oracle to reason about the viability of
the decision.
Perkins et al. [22] proposes ClearView, a system for auto-
matically repairing errors in production. The system consists
of monitoring the system execution on low-level registers
to learn invariants. Those invariants are then monitored, and
if a violation of an invariant is detected ClearView forces
the restoration. From an engineering perspective, the differ-
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ence is BanditRepair reasons on decision sequences, while
ClearView analizes each decision in isolation. From a scien-
tific perspective, our work finely characterizes of the search
space and the outcomes of runtime repair based on execution
modification.
Kling et al. [14] propose Bold a system to detect and es-
cape infinite and long-running loops. On user demand, Bolt
is attached to a running application and tries different strate-
gies to escape the infinite loop. If a strategy fails, Bolt uses
rollback to restore the state of the application and then tries
the next strategy. As BanditRepair, Bolt considers multiple
decisions for a given failure, but the main difference is that it
does not perform and reason about decision sequences made
to handle cascaded errors.
Long et al. [19] introduces the idea of “recovery shep-
herding” in a system called RCV. Upon certain errors (null
dereferences and divide by zero), recovery shepherding con-
sists in returning a manufactured value, as for failure obliv-
ious computing. The key idea of recovery shepherding is to
track the manufactured values so as to see 1) whether they
are passed to system calls or files and 2) whether they disap-
pear. In BanditRepair’s runtime patch model, 2/ our 5 kinds
of decisions also use manufactured values. However, the key
difference is that RCV reasons on each manufactured value
in isolation. On the contrary, if an injected manufactured
value triggers the creation of another one, what is called
“cascaded errors” in RCV, BanditRepair will reason on the
effect of their combinations (by storing and keeping infor-
mation about the the actual valid sequence of decision).
Jula et al. [11] presents a system to defend against dead-
locks at runtime. The system first detects synchronization
patterns of deadlocks, and when the pattern is detected, the
system avoids re-occurrences of the deadlock with addi-
tional locks. The pattern detection is related to the detector of
instances of the fault model under consideration. However,
Jula et al. do not explore and compare alternative locking
strategies. We note that the code algorithm of BanditRepair
may be plugged on top of their systems to explore the search
space of locking sequences.
Hosek and Cadar [10] switch between application ver-
sions when a bug is detected. This technique can handle
failures because some bugs disappear while others appear
between versions. We can also imagine to plug BanditRe-
pair on top of their system to systematically explore the se-
quences of runtime jumps across versions.
Assure [25] is a self-healing system based on checkpoint-
ing and error virtualization. Error virtualization consists of
handling an unknown and unrecoverable error with error
handling code that is already present in the system yet de-
signed for handling other errors. While Assure does runtime
repair by opportunistic reuse of already present recovery
code, BanditRepair handles failures by modifying the state
or flow according to a runtime patch model.
Carzaniga et al. [4] repair web applications at runtime
with set of manually written, API-specific alternatives rules.
This set can be seen as a hardcoded set of runtime patches.
On the contrary, BanditRepair does not require a list of
alternatives but instead relies on an abstract runtime patch
model that is automatically instantiated at runtime.
Berger and Zorn [3] show that is possible to effectively
tolerate memory errors and provide probabilistic memory
safety by randomizing the memory allocation and providing
memory replication. The work by Qin et al. [23] exploits a
specific hardware feature called ECC-memory for detecting
illegal memory accesses at runtime. The idea of the paper
is to use the consistency checks of the ECC-memory to
detect illegal memory accesses (for instance due to buffer
overflow). Both techniques are semantically equivalent in
the normal case. On the contrary BanditRepair is meant to
reason about the search space of execution modifications that
are not semantically equivalent, where one taken decision
can impact the rest of the computation.
Dobolyi and Weimer [8] present a technique to tolerate
null dereferences. Using code transformation, they introduce
hooks to a recovery framework. This framework is responsi-
ble for forward recovery of the form of creating a default ob-
ject of an appropriate type of skipping instructions. Kent [12]
proposes alternatives to null pointer exceptions. He proposes
to skip the failure line or exits the method by a return when
a null pointer exception is detected. In those two contribu-
tions, there is no reasoning on the search space of runtime
repair, as done in BanditRepair. We note that our runtime
patch model is inspired by theirs, while richer (method re-
turn, variable reuse).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented BanditRepair, a runtime
repair system inspired from bandit algorithms in machine
learning. The system explores the search space of runtime
repair decisions in a systematic manner. As a result, the sys-
tem controls the trade-off between exploiting known runtime
patches that are able to handle a failure and exploring new
alternative runtime patches. We have evaluated the systems
with a protocol based on 16 field failures of Java applica-
tions, showing that the system uncovers and indeed explores
the runtime repair search space.
This novel and original approach opens new research di-
rections. We are in particular interested in bridging Ban-
ditRepair with checkpoint & rollback in order to perform
large-scale parallel speculation execution. Also, we will ap-
ply BanditRepair with other runtime patches models: more
specific such as arithmetic patch models, and more generic
such as catching arbitrary exceptions.
Our future is to explore varying ζ over time, as done in
sophisticated bandit algorithms, as well as contextual multi-
armed bandit where the context is the system state the initial
failure point.
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